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Heterogeneity in the Returns to 
Schooling: Implications for Policy 
Evaluation 
Pedro Carneiro 
The economic return to schooling is a fundamental 
parameter of interest in many different areas of economics 
and public policy. It is one of the most frequently 
estimated parameters in empirical economics. Economists 
interested in growth are concerned about the role of 
schooling in productivity and growth. Economists 
studying inequality and poverty seek to learn how 
schooling increases the incomes of the poor. Therefore, 
the evaluation of policies that promote school attendance 
is a central research question. The increase in earnings 
due to additional schooling (what is usually called the 
return to schooling) is a main component of the benefits 
of proposed policies. 
The specification most often used to estimate the return 
to schooling comes from Mincer (1974): 
(1) lnY = a + ftS + c , 
where lnY is log earnings, S is years of schooling, and ft is 
the return to schooling.! There are two important sources 
of heterogeneity to consider in this equation. The first 
source is c, and it influences the potential earnings of an 
individual unifonnly, no matter what level of schooling 
he chooses. In this paper selection in levels arises if c is 
correlated with schooling. This could happen ifthose 
who have more years of schooling also have higher 
earnings ability as measured by c. The other source of 
heterogeneity is ft, the individual gain in wages from 
additional schooling. We say there is selection in returns 
if ft is correlated with schooling. This could happen if 
those who choose to get more schooling are also the 
ones who benefit the most from schooling. Both types of 
selection are sources of econometric problems. 
Most of the earlier work on this topic considered 
a representative agent model where ft is the return to 
schooling for the representative agent. Assume, for 
instance, that we want to evaluate a policy that increases 
college em-ollment by amount K. ft is the return to college 
for an individual, so B=ft*K is the total benefit of the 
policy. In the traditional approach ft is either assumed to 
be the same for evelyone (possibly conditioning on a set 
of individual characteristics) or assumed to be a random 
variable uncorrelated with S. The main econometric 
problem in estimating ft (or the average ft, in the case 
where ft is random) is that S can be correlated with c 
because of unobserved ability. Therefore it is assumed 
that there is only selection in levels but no selection in 
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returns, and the usual way to correct for this is to use 
linear instrumental variables (N). 
Ifthere is heterogeneity in ft in the population and 
individuals respond to these differences when choosing 
their level of schooling (if, for example, individuals 
decide to enroll in school based on the returns they face), 
two additional problems can emerge. The first is an 
economic problem: No single number summarizes the 
distribution of returns. It becomes necessary to define 
what the parameter is that one is interested in to answer 
a specific economic question. Separate policies target 
groups of individuals that are located in different sections 
of the distribution of ft. To compute B we need to know 
where in the distribution of ft the new entrants are coming 
from. Even though many economists focus on the average 
return to schooling in the population, this is only one of 
many parameters that can be defined, and, in general, is 
not the relevant answer to most policy questions. 2 A more 
interesting pair of questions is, "What is the return to the 
marginal entrant?" and "Is it above or below the return to 
the average student?" 
The second problem is an econometric problem. 
Once we have defined the parameter of interest, how 
can we estimate it? The usual intuitions about how 
instrumental variables work break down in a model where 
ft is heterogeneous in the population and individuals 
respond to these differences when making their schooling 
decisions (Heckman and Vytlacil 2003 and Carneiro, 
Heckman, and Vytlaci12001). In general, applications 
of the linear IV method (the solution to the selection 
problem in the common return model) will not generate 
estimates of policy-relevant parameters. 
The recent literature reveals substantial concern about 
heterogeneity in returns to education. Card (1999,2001) 
surveys this literature with a special focus on instrumental 
variables estimates of ft, since this has been the preferred 
method of estimation for most of the economists working 
in this area in recent years (Heckman 1997 and Heckman 
and VytlaciI1998). The question he asks is the following: 
"If ft varies in the population, what parameter do we 
get from instrumental variables estimates of the returns 
to schooling?" Based on the local average treatment 
effect (LATE) framework ofImbens and Angrist (1994), 
he interprets the instrumental variables estimate as a 
weighted average of returns for individuals induced 
to change their level of schooling by variation in the 
instrumental variable (Kling 2001). If the instrument 
being used is distance to college, IV measures a weighted 
average of the return for individuals who are induced 
to increase their schooling by reductions in commuting 
costs associated with having a college nearer to their 
place of residence. The IV approach has been advanced 
as less resnictive and more robust than econometric 
selection models, which provide an alternative way to 
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account for selection in the estimation of the returns to 
schooling3 (Krueger 2000). However, as suggested by 
Card's interpretation, for many policy questions it does 
not estimate the policy-relevant parameters unless the 
policy affects the same people that are affected by the 
instrument. Therefore, the policy evaluation problem is 
greatly simplified if the assumption of a common ft in the 
population is satisfied, since there is only one parameter 
of interest, which can be estimated using IV. But, 
empirically, is this a valid working assumption? This is 
the main question of this paper. 
I focus on the high school-college transition and 
examine whether selection in the returns to college is an 
empirically important phenomenon. I present estimates of 
the returns for the average person in the population, the 
average person in college, and the average person at the 
margin between going or not going to college. I analyze 
different demographic groups in three different datasets: 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 
(NLSY79), the High School and Beyond (HSB), and the 
Panel Study ofIncome Dynamics (PSID). Across these 
different samples, I find that the average person going to 
college has a higher return than the marginal person who 
is indifferent about emolling in college or not (the only 
exception is white females in HSB). This suggests that 
heterogeneity is important and needs to be accounted for 
in policy analysis. In particular, it suggests that education 
policies that increase college emollment in the population 
attract individuals of low returns to college (relative to the 
average college student), and that we can estimate exactly 
the average return to college among the individuals 
enticed into college by different policies. 
I start by presenting a simple model of schooling and 
earnings, the framework for the analysis performed in 
this paper. Assume that there are two schooling levels: 
high school (S=O) and college (S=I). The log earnings of 
individual i ifhe goes to college are 
(2) lnYIf = ,u1f(X) + Uji · 
Ifhe does not go to college his earnings are 
(3) InYoi = ,uo/X) + UOi ' 
where X are observable characteristics for each individual 
and (Up Uo) are unobservable characteristics such that 
E(Uj ) = 0, 
E(Uo) =0. 
Additive separability between X and (Up Uo) is not 
necessary for most of what I do in this paper, but it is a 
convenient assumption that simplifies the analysis and 
the empirical work (Heckman and Vytlacil2000, 2003). 
Individuals can differ in their observables and in their 
unobservables. This is the potential outcomes model used 
in studies of unionism, migration, sectorial choice, job 
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training, and in the literature on policy evaluation. 
The return to schooling for individual i is 
ft; = InYji - InYol 
= ,ul(X) - ,uoCJi) + Uli - UOi ' 
and it varies with X and Uj - Uo' We only observe an 
individual's earnings for the sector he chooses. Then 
observed earnings are 
ln~ = S; InY1; + (1 - S)lnYoi 
= ,ul)\) + Sl,uj(~) -,uo(~) + Uji - UOi ] + UOi 
= ,uo(~) + SA + UOi ' 
which is exactly in the same form as (1) (with the 
inclusion of observable variables X), where 
(J.i = ,uo(~) , 
ci = UOj 
(and ft is a function of X and U j - Uo). Individual i 
chooses to go to college (S = 1) if 
(4) ,us (X;,Z) + USi > 0, 
where Z are variables that affect the choice of schooling 
but not the potential earnings in each sector, and USi is 
the unobservable in the choice of schooling equation. 
Equation (4) should be interpreted as a reduced form 
representation of the choice problem, which is typical in 
applications of selection models.4 Assume that 
(5) ,us (~,Zi) is a nondegenerate function of Z 
(so that Z is not independent of S) and that 
(6) Up UO' UsIlZ I X 
and 
(7) Uj , Uo' UsIlX, 
where Il denotes independence. Z is a vector of 
instrumental variables. 
Theoretically, heterogeneity is an important problem; 
however, dealing with heterogeneity is difficult. The 
fundamental question I ask in this paper is, "Empirically, 
how important is it to account for heterogeneity in the 
evaluation of education policy?" 
In the next section I assess the empirical importance 
of heterogeneity and selection for educational policy 
evaluation. The central parameter of my analysis is the 
marginal treatment effect (MTE), which is defined as 
MTE(x,u) = E(ft I X= x, Us = u) 
= ,ul(X) - ,uo (x) + E[Uj - Uo I X = x, Us = u] 
(Heckman and Vytlacill999, 2000, 2001b, 2003; 
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil2001; and Bjorklund and 
Moffitt 1987). MTE(.,u) measures the average return to 
schooling for individuals with X=x and Us =u. X and Us 
are variables that determine whether or not an individual 
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goes to school (see equation (4».5 As an example, suppose 
X is a scalar and f-l sC~, Z) is increasing in X, so that people 
are more likely to go to school the higher their X and the 
higher their Us' If the MTE is increasing in X and Us' then 
the average return for those going to college (individuals 
with high X and high Us) is higher than the average return 
for those not going to college (individuals with low S 
and low Us), Dependence betweenj3 and (X, Us) leads to 
dependence between j3 and S and to a model where there 
is selection on returns. However, if j3 is independent of X 
and Us' then there is no selection. In that case, MTE(x,u) 
= 7J , where 7J is a constant independent of X and Us' 
Notice that the marginal treatment effect is a function 
of an unobservable variable: Us' There is a large 
literature in econometrics that develops methods to deal 
with selection ofunobservables. In this paper I use a 
nonparametric selection mode16 and apply the method 
of local instlUmental variables (LIV)7 introduced by 
Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) and applied in Carneiro, 
Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001). To focus on unobservables, 
and also for easier exposition, I keep the conditioning on 
X implicit. The goal is to estimate 
E(lnYI -lnYo I X = x,Us = u) = jJ (x) + E [Ul - Uo I 
X = x,Us = u] 7J (x) = f-ll(x) - f-lo(x). 
The method of local instrumental variables requires 
that there exist a continuous instlUment Z satisfying (5) 
and (6). The intuition of the method is best explained with 
an example. Suppose the model is the following: 
S = 1 [- Zy + Us> 0] , 
where Z (the instrumental variable) is tuition in county of 
residence y> 0 and Us is "ability" and it is unobserved. 8 
Assume we start by using only two counties: A and B. 
In county A, Z=$l 00, and in county B, Z=$200. The two 
counties are equal in every aspect except tuition. We can 
estimate j3 by standard IV using tuition as the instlUment 
and data only from counties A and B: 
fl 100,200 E(lnY I Z = 100) - E(lnY I Z = 200) 
IV E(S I Z= 100) - E (S I Z= 200) 
=E[j31 S(100) = 1,S(200) = 0] 
= E(J3 I 100y < Us < 200y) . 
This is the local average treatment effect for the case 
where the instrument takes values Z=100 and Z=200. It 
is the average return for individuals who go to college if 
Z= 100 but do not go if Z=200. Therefore these individuals 
are at the margin between going to college and not going 
if Z is between 100 and 200. The fact that they are at the 
margin at such a low level of tuition means that they have 
low ability, US .9 
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Suppose now we take two different counties. County 
C has Z=21 00 and County D has Z=2200. Using C and D 
only, 
jJ 2100,2200 _ E(lnY I Z = 2100) - E(lnY I Z = 2200) 
IV - E(S I Z= 2100) - E (S I Z= 2200) 
= E[j31 S(2100) = 1,S(2200) = 0] 
= E(J312100y < Us < 2200y) . 
This is the average return for individuals not going to 
school if Z=2200 but going to school if Z=2100. They are 
at the margin at a high level of tuition, which means that 
they have a high level of ability. 
The general formula for any pair of counties is 
jJ z,z' _ E(lnYI Z= z) - E(lnYI Z= z') 
IV - E(S I Z=z) - E (S I Z= z') 
= E[j31 S(z) = 1,S(z') = 0] = E(J31 zy < Us < z'y). 
We can make z and z' close and get 
E[j3 I Us = zy] . Therefore, by valying Z we can trace out 
how j3 varies with Us' This is the marginal treatment 
effect. If the MTE is flat, then there is no heterogeneity. 
Notice that to trace out whole support of Us we need large 
support for the instrument. 
To put this in practice we first aggregate multiple 
instruments into a single (cost) index (by modeling the 
probability of selection): 
S=l[Zy=Us>O]. 
By aggregating multiple instruments into a single index 
and then using it as the instlUmental variable, I can get 
a larger support over which to estimate the MTE (larger 
in the sense of having extremes that are farther away and 
having no holes in the middle of the support). Then we 
constlUct P(Z) =Pr(S= liz) and use it as the instrument: 
jJ p,p'_ E(lnY I P = p) - E(lnY I P = pI) 
IV - E(S I P = p) - E (S I P = pI) 
E(lnY I P = p) - E(lnY I P = pI) 
p-p' 
In the numerator we evaluate the function E(ln YjP) in 
two points (p and pI) and then we take the difference. 
In the denominator we have the difference in the points 
of evaluation. Notice that this is like a derivative. In 
summary, the first step is to construct E(lnYjP). This 
is simply a regression of Yon P and can be estimated 
parametrically or nonparametrically. Then we take 
the derivative. If the derivative is flat, then selection 
is not important (heterogeneity plays a small role in 
the problem). Therefore a simple test of selection on 
unobservables is the following: "Is E(1nYjP) linear in P?" 
Standard instrumental variable assumes no selection on 
unobservables and therefore imposes linearity in P. 
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In this framework, we can also allow for X (example: 
test scores), in a parametric way. In this case, 
fJ = (Xj - (Xo + RJ(X) + U1 - Uo . 
A simple formal justification for this estimator of the 
marginal treatment effect is the following: we can 
transform the variables in the choice model in (4) such 
that it becomes 
S=1 ifP(Z) >Vs ' 
where 
P(Z) = 1 - Fu,. (- f-liZ) = Pr(S= 11 Z), 
Vs= 1- F u, (Us), 
Notice that Vs ~UniftO,I] (with uniform distribution 
taking values between 0 and 1). Under these conditions 
Heckman and Vytlacil (2000, 2003) and Carneiro, 
Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001) show that we can identify 
E(f31 Vs = vs ) by first running a (nonparametric) 
regression of InY on P and then computing the derivative 
with respect to P. Notice that we can write observed 
outcomes as 
InY = SInYj + (1 - S)lnYo = f-lo(X) + SjJ + Uo + S(UJ - Uo)' 
then, 
E(lnYI P=p) = f-lo + jJp + E(Uj - Uo I P > Vs,P = p)p 
= f-lo + fJp + Ji E(Uj - Uo I Vs = v)dv, 
and finally, 
aE(ln~1p=p) P+E(Uj-Uol Vs=p)p=ECfJI Vs=p). 
A continuous instrument Z generates a continuous P, 
which we need to have in order to be able to compute this 
derivative. E(lnYJP) and its derivative can be estimated 
using standard nonparametric methods. 
One reason why it is useful to study the MTE is that 
it is a natural way to look at heterogeneity. But there is 
one other important reason. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 
2000, 200lb, 2003) and Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 
(2002) show how we can compute different evaluation 
parameters by constructing different weighted averages of 
the MTE. For example, to compute the average return to 
schooling in the population one can weight the MTE by 
the distribution of (X, Us) in the population. For treatment 
on the treated, one weights MTE by the distribution 
of (X, Us) for the individuals that go to college. For 
the policy-relevant parameter we weight MTE by the 
distribution of (X,Us) for those individuals induced to go 
to college by the policy. These weights are interesting 
objects in themselves because they tell us the distribution 
of observable and unobservable determinants of returns 
for different groups in the population. For example, by 
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considering them together with the MTE we can have an 
idea of whether a given policy benefits mostly individuals 
with positive returns or mostly individuals with negative 
returns to college (or high vs. low returns). 
To calculate these weights we need to estimate the joint 
distribution of (%,Z, Us), However, under assumptions (6) 
and (7), 
fz,x,us (z,x,us) = fx(x)fusCus)Jiz I X=x). 
Bothfx(x) andft(z I X = x) can be directly estimated 
from the data.f~,(us) can in principle be estimated 
nonparametrically from (4) (Matzkin 1992) although 
discrete choice models are commonly estimated by 
assuming a parametric functional form forfus(us ) (such 
as a normal, a logistic, or a uniform). In this paper the 
empirical results I present are for a normal. Notice that 
even though one does not know a priori which individuals 
will be affected by a given policy, it is possible to estimate 
the distribution of (X, Us) for these individuals by making 
use of the schooling model. Suppose that one of the 
variables in Z is tuition and the policy we are interested 
in is a tuition subsidy of A given for each person that 
decides to attend college. Furthermore, for simplicity of 
exposition, assume that we can write (4) as 
S= l[Xyx+Z+ Us>O] 
(assuming yz for simplicity). Therefore an individual that 
chooses not to go to college without the subsidy may be 
induced to enroll in college once the subsidy is in place if 
XYx + Z + Us < 0, XYx + (Z - A) + Us> 0 
or if 
- (Z - A) <XYx + Us < -Z. 
This condition defines the set of (X,Us) values such that 
individuals who have (X,Us) in this set switch from one 
schooling level to another in response to the policy, for 
a given value of Z. Once we estimatef(Z,X,Us)' we can 
compute the policy weight. The class of policies that 
can be evaluated with this method have the following 
characteristics: 1) the policy cannot affect the outcome 
equation, either through X, Uj ' and Uo' or through the 
functions f-l/X) and f-lo(X); it can only operate through 
the choice equation (this rules out general equilibrium 
effects); 2) the policy has to operate through one of 
the Z variables that are observed in the data; and 3) the 
policy cannot change Z to values outside the support 
of the observed data, unless we can extrapolate by 
parameterizing in advance the relationship between Z, S, 
X, and Us outside the support of observed data (Heckman 
2001). The idea behind this exercise is that variation in 
Z in the cross section mimics variation in the policy. For 
example, by using LATE we can estimate the average 
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return to college for individuals that would go to college 
if they faced a net tuition of $1 000 but not if they faced a 
net tuition of $2000: 
fl E(lnY I Z = 1000) - E(lnY I Z = 2000) 
P E(S I Z= 1000) - E(S I Z= 2000) 
= ErJ3 I S(1000) = 1, S(2000) = 0] 
= E(j311000y < Us < 2000y) . 
This parameter measures the effect of giving a tuition 
subsidy of $1 000 to individuals that currently face a net 
tuition of $2000. Using this method we can estimate the 
effect of giving a subsidy of $1000 to individuals facing a 
tuition of $2100, $2200, $2300, etc., and therefore we can 
estimate the overall effect of a tuition subsidy of $1000. 
Using cross sectional variation in the data to mimic policy 
variation is the way structural models usually wade. This 
is also the basis for the estimator proposed by Ichimura 
and Taber (2000, 2002), which is related to the estimator 
of policy effects used in this paper. 
The policy just presented is very simple and consists 
of a change in Z that is uniform across all levels of Z 
(subtracting A to each value of Z). Although this is the sct 
of policies considered in this paper, it is possible to study 
much more general policies, provided that they are subject 
to the conditions specified in the previous paragraph. For 
example, the subsidy could be proportional (in which case 
the tuition faced by each individual after the policy is 
implemented is AZ, instead of Z - A, where A is the subsidy 
rate). Or the subsidy could be targeted to individuals 
with a given level of X and Z. More general policies are 
considered in Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b, 2003) and in 
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001). 
I now present estimates of the MTE and of different 
policy evaluation parameters across different samples, 
using the framework just described. The figure on this 
page shows an estimate of the MTE for white males in 
the NLSY79. Returns are high for individuals who have 
unobservables that make them either very likely to go 
to school (high U) or very unlikely to go to school (low 
U), leading to aU-shaped function. In a Roy model, 
where people select into the sector where their gain is 
highest, we expect returns to be higher for individuals 
who are more likely to go to school. This would lead to a 
rising MTE as a function of Us' However, there are costs 
of going to college, and if costs and returns of going to 
college are positively correlated then it is possible to have 
segments of the MTE where average returns increase 
and at the same time the lilcelihood of going to college 
decreases (leading to a declining MTE). Therefore, 
the U-shaped pattern for the MTE may result from the 
intersection of two different populations, both of them 
with monotone MTEs in terms of X and Us' but one in 
which it is increasing in these variables and the other in 
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which it is decreasing (I illustrate this in the appendix). 
Individuals in the latter population have high returns to 
college but still choose not to email. This may be because 
they face high psychic costs of schooling or because of 
credit constraints. Those in the middle of the distribution 
of U have the lowest returns. IO Returns are also the high~st for those individuals with high AFQT ("A" in the 
figure) and high Us.11 In sUllllllary, heterogeneity in returns 
is an important feature of the data. Returns vary across 
individuals with different levels of observables (AFQT in 
this case) and unobservables CUs)' The magnitude of this 
heterogeneity is very large. Returns to one year of college 
can be as high as 40 percent and as low as 0 percent. 12 
The table on the following page summarizes the results 
across datasets. It presents estimates of four parameters 
across samples. The first row shows the average return 
MTE(A,U) Estimated Using LIV: 
White Males from NLSY79 
1.4 
MTE 
1.2 
0 .• 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0 .• 
0.4 
0.2 
Us o -1 A 
in the population, the second row shows the average 
return for those emolled in college, the third shows the 
average return for those not enrolled in college, and 
the fourth shows the average return for the marginal 
individual. In four of the five datasets analyzed,D the 
marginal person has a return below the return for the 
average person that went to college. The magnitude of 
this difference is substantial. Most policies will affect 
individuals at the margin, so the return for the marginal 
person is a more relevant parameter to evaluate policies 
that expand college emollment than the return for the 
average person. In the dissertation I present estimates of 
the returns for individuals induced to emoll in college by 
different amounts of a tuition subsidy, using the methods 
of Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b). They are substantially 
different from the return to college for the average student. 
In summary, this paper makes four main points: 
1) Heterogeneity and selection are important in the 
returns to college. The average individual in the 
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Estimates ofthe Return to Schooling-Local Instrumental Variables Using Local Linear Regression 
NLSY79 (whites) HSB (whites) PSID (whites) 
Males Females Males Females Males 
E (fJ) 0.1625 0.2086 0.1702 0.3236 0.3287 
(0.0319) (0.0325) (0.0393) (0.0566) (0.0504) 
E(fJIS=I) 0.1807 0.2646 0.2418 0.3146 0.3900 
(0.0572) (0.0566) (0.0701) (0.1037) (0.0727) 
E (fJ1 S= 0) 0.01456 0.1597 0.1123 0.3347 0.2373 
(0.0415 (0.0448) (0.0908) (0.0783) (0.0615) 
E [8 I fls (X; Z) + Us = 0] 0.1501 0.2108 0.1802 0.3301 0.2787 
(0.0296) (0.0324) (0.0984) (0.0479) (0.0476) 
NOTE: Standard errors are bootstrapped. NLSY79 = National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 dataset; 
HSB = High School and Beyond dataset; and PSID = Panel Study of Income Dynamics dataset. 
population has a different return to college than the 
marginal individual. 
2) Individual returns are detennined by both 
observable and unobservable components of ability 
(or abilities), which differ in the popUlation. It is 
important to account for both. Ignoring selection 
on unobservables may lead to large biases. The 
distributions of these abilities are velY different 
across the populations of high school graduates, 
college graduates, and individuals at the margin. 
Therefore the distributions of returns to schooling 
are also very different across these different groups. 
to other areas of economics and policy evaluation 
where heterogeneity and self-selection are thought to 
be important. It breaks down when we consider large 
scale policies. Neither OLS nor linear IV (using as 
the instrumental variable an index of commonly 
used instruments variables in the literature) estimate 
policy-relevant parameters. However, IV performs 
much better than OLS. 
4) Most of the instrumental variables used in this 
literature are either correlated with measured 
cognitive ability-and therefore are not valid 
instruments if ability is not included in the model-
or wealdy correlated with schooling. When family 
background variables are included in the model 
as a proxy for ability, the correlation between the 
instrument and ability becomes, in some cases, 
smaller, but so does the correlation between the 
instrument and schooling. I do not elaborate on this 
point in this summary. 
3) Since heterogeneity is important we need to clearly 
define the particular return we are interested in. The 
average return to schooling in the population is not 
the right parameter to evaluate a tuition policy-
what we call the policy-relevant parameter. Even 
though many economists focus on the former, the 
latter is what we want. We would also thinlc that to 
evaluate the benefits of different tuition policies we 
would need to estimate different parameters, one for 
each policy. However, I show that, empirically, the 
relevant return to schooling required to evaluate a 
broad range of different policies is not very different 
across them, although this is not true for all policies. 
For a broad range of policies, we need only one 
number, the return to schooling for the marginal 
person, even if these policies have velY different 
effects on college enrollment. This is a surprising 
result. It is an empirical result about the quantitative 
magnitude ofthe effects of different policies, not 
However, there are some important caveats to the 
results to consider: 
a theoretical statement about evaluating policies 
in other fields of social policy. Theoretically, it 
can only happen in special cases, which seems to 
be empirically important. It cannot be generalized 
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1) The results of this paper rely on the validity of the 
instrumental variables used, after controlling for 
measured cognitive ability. 
2) As in other studies of the returns to schooling that 
rely on the method of instrumental variables, the 
estimates I obtain are not very precise. It is usually 
found that IV estimates of the returns to education 
are higher than OLS estimates of the same returns 
but that these two parameters are not statistically 
significantly different from each other. Likewise, I 
find that matching and local instrumental variables 
of estimates of the return to schooling are not 
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statistically different. However, the magnitude of the 
numbers is consistently very different. 
3) General equilibrium effects of policies are not 
considered, and for the particular case of tuition 
policies they are potentially velY important 
(Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 1998). 
4) There is no consideration of school quality nor 
of how students are allocated across schools. 
Tuition policies are assumed to operate on a single 
dimension: college emollment. One obvious 
problem is that if tuition is correlated with school 
quality and if school quality is a detern1inant of the 
returns to schooling, then tuition may no longer be 
a valid instrument (Carneiro and Heckman 2002). 
Furthelmore there is a lot of heterogeneity in types 
of college, degrees offered, and types of students, 
which may cause my estimates of the retul11S to 
college to be difficult to interpret. Related to this last 
point is that I aggregate individuals with different 
amounts of college education into a single category. 
However, this latter problem can be handled by an 
extension of the model to a multi-outcome setting, 
which is the subject of another paper (Cal11eiro and 
Heckman 2001). 
5) Finally, preliminary analysis of blacks and 
Hispanics shows different results. The results ofthis 
paper are not generalizable to other racial groups. 
These need to be studied separately. 
I conclude with two additional notes, both related 
to important extensions of this work that are currently 
in progress. The first one concel11S the simulation of 
policies. The choice model estimated in this paper is 
velY simple, and therefore the way the policies can 
operate is very limited. That may be driving part of the 
result that one number is all we need to evaluate a broad 
range of policies. More analysis is needed, and better 
models of schooling attainment need to be incorporated. 
Furthermore, local average tuition in the county of 
residence at 17 (the tuition variable used in this paper) 
may not be a good approximation to the tuition faced by 
each individual. The second point concerns important 
recent developments in the study of heterogeneity in 
retul11s. The evidence in this paper (and in many others) 
suggests that heterogeneity is important. Although the 
focus of the literature (and also ofthis paper) has been 
on the estimation of different mean retums, much more 
can be learned from the estimation of distributions of 
returns. Call1eiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2001, 2003) 
estimate distributions ofretul11s to schooling using a very 
different methodology fi·om the one in the paper (which 
was developed to deal with means). They show that 
there is substantial dispersion in the retums to schooling 
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and that many individuals make a mistake by going to 
college (they have negative retums). Moreover, there is 
substantial uncertainty about wages and retul11S at the 
time agents make their schooling decisions, which helps 
explain why there are so many mistakes ex post. 
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1. j3 is the percentage increase in earnings due to an additional 
year of schooling. 
2. In particular, suppose we have a policy that consists of a 
tuition subsidy we want to evaluate. The relevant return 
in this case is the return to schooling for those induced to 
go to school by the subsidy, not the average return in the 
population. 
3. However, Vytlacil (2002) shows that the assumptions 
underlying the LATE parameter of Imbens and Angrist 
(1994) are the same assumptions of a nonparametric 
selection model, and therefore the two approaches are 
equivalent. 
4. Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001) show how (4) can 
be justified by an economic model where the agent chooses 
the level of schooling that maximizes his present value of 
earnings. 
5. I assumed that Z was independent of U j and Uo conditional 
onX (see condition (6)). 
6. Typical applications of selection models assume a 
parametric form for the Ullobservables in the choice and 
outcome equations (for example, multivariate nonnal), 
which in tum implies a parametric form for the MTE. In 
contrast I estimate the MTE nonparametrically. 
7. Typical applications of instrumental variables (for example, 
linear instrumental variables) use global variation instead of 
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local variation in the instrument (such as linear regression 
of Yon X using global variation in X to fit a line while a 
nonparametric regression of Yon X uses local variation in X 
to fit a curve). 
8. The unobservable does not have to be "ability." I call 
it ability for simplicity's sake, but Us can represent any 
unobservable (example: unobservable cost). 
9. Ifindividuals switch when tuition varies little at such 
a low range, then that means that even though they are 
facing tuition at a velY low level before the change, these 
individuals still decide not to emoll in college. Therefore 
they are lilcely to have low levels of ability. 
10. The same patterns are found for white females in the 
NLSY79 and for white males in the HSB. Even when test 
scores are excluded, the MTE has this V-shaped pattern. 
However, for the PSID the MTE is rising. 
11. One possible story for a V-shaped MTE is the following: 
The rising section at the end is the usual story: individuals 
with higher ability are more lilcely to go to school and they 
have higher returns. Individuals with very low ability are 
verly unlikely to go to school. However, because they have 
such low ability and possibly have learned very little during 
high school, teaching them some basic skills may generate 
very large returns, generating the declining segment in the 
MTE. While the latter is suggestive of a decreasing returns 
stOly (those with high levels of human capital benefit less 
from learning than those with low levels of human capital), 
the former is suggestive of a complementarity story (those 
with higher ability benefit more from further learning). 
12. The numbers presented in the figure are gross returns. To 
obtain annual returns we divide them by 3.5, the difference 
between the average years of schooling of individuals who 
attended college and high school graduates. 
13. In the NLSY79 we include AFQT scores in the outcome 
equations and we use as instruments number of siblings, 
parental education, tuition at local college at age 17, 
distance to nearest college at age 14, local unemployment 
rate in county of residence at age 17, and average blue 
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collar wage in state of residence at age 17. Including family 
background variables in the wage equation (so that they 
are not instruments anymore) did not change the results 
significantly but decreased the precision of the estimates. 
For HSB we include math test scores in the wage equation 
and we use as instruments family background variables. 
For the PSID we do not use any test score and we use as 
instruments family background variables and average tuition 
in the state of residence at 17. 
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